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Abstract
This paper shows that accounting for variation in mistakes can be crucial for welfare analysis.
Focusing on consumer underreaction to not-fully-salient sales taxes, we show theoretically that
the eciency costs of taxation are amplied by dierences in underreaction across individuals
and across tax rates.

To empirically assess the importance of these issues, we implement an

online shopping experiment in which 2,998 consumers purchase common household products,
facing tax rates that vary in size and salience.

We replicate prior ndings that, on average,

consumers underreact to non-salient sales taxesconsumers in our study react to existing sales
taxes as if they were only 25% of their size. However, we nd signicant individual dierences in
this underreaction, and accounting for this heterogeneity increases the eciency cost of taxation
estimates by at least 200%. Tripling existing sales tax rates nearly doubles consumers' attention
to taxes, and accounting for this endogeneity increases eciency cost estimates by 336%. Our
results provide new insights into the mechanisms and determinants of boundedly rational processing of not-fully-salient incentives, and our general approach provides a framework for robust
behavioral welfare analysis.
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1 Introduction
When incentive schemes are complex, or when decision-relevant attributes are not fully salient,
consumers may make mistakes.

A growing body of work documents inattention to, or incorrect

beliefs about, nancial incentives such as sales taxes (Chetty, Looney and Kroft, 2009), shipping
and handling charges (Hossain and Morgan, 2006), energy prices (Allcott, 2015), and out-of-pocket
insurance costs (Abaluck and Gruber, 2011). Such studies typically estimate the average mistake,
usually because inferring mistakes at the individual level is dicult or impossible with available
data. Correspondingly, policy analysis building on these results often studies a representative agent
committing the average mistake, and thus assumes that mistakes are homogeneous.
In this paper, we demonstrate that accounting for variation in mistakes can substantially impact
policy analysis. We highlight two crucial ways in which variation in mistakes matters. First, the
variation in mistakes across consumers matters: the greater the individual dierences, the lower
the allocational eciency of the market, because these dierences drive a wedge between who buys
the product and who benets from it the most. Second, the variation in mistakes across dierent
incentives matters:

this variation creates a debiasing channel that can accentuate the demand

response to policy changes.

In the theoretical component of this paper, we formalize the role of

these two channels in shaping the eciency cost of taxation when consumers misreact to sales taxes.
In the empirical component of this paper, we directly examine these two dimensions of variation in
a large-scale online shopping experiment and demonstrate that their quantitative impact on welfare
analysis is substantial.
To formalize these arguments, we begin with a modelbuilding on and generalizing Chetty
(2009), Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009, henceforth CLK) and Finkelstein (2009)of consumers
who choose whether or not to purchase a good in the presence of a sales tax.

The sales tax is

potentially non-salient, and consumers may not correctly account for its presence in their purchasing decisions. Breaking from earlier theoretical treatments of tax salience, we allow for arbitrary
heterogeneity in both consumers' valuations for the products and consumers' misreaction to the
tax.
We present a series of results that generalize the canonical Harberger (1964) formula for the
eciency costs of taxation. We nd that the eciency cost of imposing a small tax in a previously
untaxed market is increasing in the mean of the weights that the marginal consumers place on
the tax when making purchasing decisionsthus, as in CLK, homogeneous underreaction reduces
eciency costs.

1

However, we additionally show that ineciency is increasing in the variance of

misreactions to a degree of equal quantitative importance. The result arises because variation in
mistakes across consumers generates misallocation of products. When underreaction to the tax is

1

This result is derived in the absence of income eects, or under the assumption that the purchases in question

constitute a small share of the budget. We maintain these assumptions throughout most of the paper, as the we have
in mind products whose prices are small relative to consumers' total earnings. However, CLK show that with income
eects, underreaction can sometimes generate larger eciency costs when consumers make a big-ticket purchase due
to the over-estimation of their remaining budget.

1

homogeneous, the product is always purchased by those consumers who value it the most, and thus
the market preserves the ecient sorting that is obtained with fully optimizing consumers. However,
when consumers vary in their misreaction, purchasing decisions depend on both their valuation of
the good

and

on their propensity to ignore the tax, thus breaking the ecient sorting property. The

consequences of misallocation are particularly stark when supply is inelastic relative to demand and
thus the equilibrium quantity purchased is relatively unaected by taxationa situation in which
eciency costs are low when consumers optimize perfectly but can be substantial in the presence
of varying mistakes.
When evaluating small taxes, the mean and variance of marginal consumers' misreactiontogether
with the price elasticity of demandare sucient statistics for computing eciency costs. When
considering increasing pre-existing taxes, however, accounting for how misreaction changes with the
tax rate is crucial. If increases in the tax rate increase attention, and thus debias consumers, the
distortionary eects of tax increases can be substantially higher than would otherwise be expected
under the hypothesis that attention is exogenous. Intuitively, this is because consumers act as if
prices have increased not only by the salient portion of the new tax, but also by a portion of the
existing tax that they had previously ignored, but now do not.

2

Taken together, these theoretical results show that empirical estimates of the variation in mistakes are crucial for welfare analysis.

However, measurement of variation in mistakes requires

datasets containing richer information than simple aggregate demand responses.

This motivates

our experimental design.
Our experiment studies the behavior of 2,998 consumersapproximately matching the US adult
population on household income, gender, and agedrawn from the forty-ve US states with positive
sales taxes. The experiment utilizes an online pricing task with twenty dierent non-tax-exempt
household products (such as cleaning supplies), and with between- and within-subject variation of
three dierent decision environments. The decision environments induce exogenous variation in the
tax applied to purchases, featuring either 1) no sales taxes, 2) standard sales taxes identical to those
in the consumer's city of residence, or 3) high sales taxes that are triple those in the consumers'
city of residence. Decisions in the experiment are incentive compatible: study participants use a
$20 budget to potentially buy one of the randomly chosen products, and purchased products are
shipped to their homes.
We begin our empirical analysis by estimating the average amount by which study participants
underreact to taxes. Following CLK, we measure underreaction by estimating the implicit weight
placed on taxes, denoted by

θ.

This measure constitutes a sucient statistic for welfare analysis

when mistakes are homogeneous. In the standard-tax condition, we estimate an average

θ

of 0.25:

study participants react to the taxes as if they are only 25% of their size. This result is quantitatively
similar to that of CLK, who nd an average

2

θ

of 0.35 in an analysis of grocery-store purchases and

Moreover, increases in the tax rate can also aect the variance of underreaction, which in turn aects eciency

costs.

2

an average

θ

of

0.06

in an analysis of demand for alcoholic beverages.

Our estimates fall within

the condence intervals of this previous work, and our design aords signicantly greater statistical
power.
In the triple-tax condition, in contrast, study participants react to the taxes as if they are just
under 50% of their actual size. Across specications, this increase in weight placed on the tax is
signicant at least at the 5% level, and provides initial evidence that consumers are more attentive
to higher taxes. Complementing this evidence, we also show that consumers are on average more
likely to underreact to taxes on particularly cheap products (priced below $5), than they are to
taxes on more expensive products (priced above $5).
Having established variation of misreaction across tax rates, in the second part of our empirical
analysis we focus on variation of misreaction across consumers. This analysis is directly motivated
by the eciency cost formulas that we derive, which show that the eciency cost of a small tax

t

on a product sold at price

the margin at

p

and

t.

p

depends on the variance of underreaction by consumers who are on

The corresponding statistic of interest is thus the averagecomputed with

respect to the distribution of

p

and

t

in the experimentof

V ar[θ|p, t].

We bound this statistic

through a novel combination of a self-classifying survey question and experimental behavior, in a
way that requires no assumptions about truth-telling or metacognition. Our estimates of the bound
imply that for taxes that are the size of those observed in the US, the variance of consumer mistakes
increases the eciency cost estimate by over 200% relative to what would be inferred under the
assumption that consumers are homogeneous in their mistakes.
This paper relates to three distinct literatures.

First, beyond extending and generalizing the

existing work on tax salience (e.g., CLK, Finkelstein 2009, Feldman and Rue 2015, Feldman
et al. 2015), the paper broadly contributes to a growing theoretical and empirical literature in
behavioral public economics (see Chetty 2015 for a review, and Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and
Congdon 2012 and Farhi and Gabaix 2015 for general theoretical frameworks). Some of our own
previous work on corrective taxation in energy markets has emphasized the importance of welfare
estimates that are robust to heterogeneous bias (Allcott and Taubinsky 2015; Allcott, Mullainathan
and Taubinsky 2014).

3

This paper focuses on an importantly dierent domain and is the rst,

to our knowledge, to explicitly formalize the welfare-relevant statistics of mistake variation and to
empirically measure those statistics.
on tax

4
misunderstanding;

These results have immediate applications to the literature

however, our framework for analyzing variation in mistakes is broadly

portable, and can serve as a template for empirical analysis of other psychological biases, and in
other domains of behavior.

3

See also Farhi and Gabaix (2015) for further results relating to these issues, including the importance of attention

heterogeneity for Pigouvian taxation, and the implications of misperceptions of and inattention to taxes for income
taxation.

4

For work documenting tax misperceptions see, e.g., Chetty et al. (2013), Chetty and Saez (2013), Bhargava and

Manoli (2015) on misunderstanding of the EITC; Abeler and Jäger (2015) for lab experimental evidence about the
impacts of complexity; de Bartolome (1995), Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004), Feldman, Katuscak and Kawano (2016)
for work related to income tax misperceptions.

3

Second, our experimental ndings are also relevant to the growing literature on rm and consumer interactions in markets with shrouded attributes (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Heidhues et al.,
2017; Veiga and Weyl, 2016). The predictions of these models rely on particular assumptions about
the heterogeneity of attention to the shrouded attributes, as well as how the inattention depends on
the size of the shrouded attribute. Our estimates can thus help guide the quantitative predictions

5

of these models.

Third, our work contributes to the literature on boundedly rational value computation (see,
e.g., Gabaix, 2014; Woodford, 2012; Caplin and Dean, 2015a; Chetty, 2012).

To the best of our

knowledge, our result that consumers underreact less to higher tax rates provides one of the rst
experimental demonstrations in a naturalistic setting of imperfect processing of a nancial attribute
responding to economic incentives.

6

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical framework. Section 3 presents
our experimental design.

Section 4 quanties average underreaction across dierent taxes, while

Section 5 quanties the variance of underreaction across consumers. Section 6 utilizes our theoretical
framework to discuss the welfare implications of our empirical estimates. Section 7 concludes.

2 Theory
This section analyzes the tax policy implications of variation in consumers' inattention to or misunderstanding of tax instruments. Specically, we generalize Harberger's (1964) canonical formulas for
the eciency costs of taxation, as well as CLK's formulas for the case of homogeneous consumers.
The formulas we develop transparently highlight the importance of accounting for the variation of
mistakes across both consumers and tax sizes. The results can be immediately applied to questions
about optimal Ramsey or Pigouvian taxeswhich we summarize in Section 2.5 and elaborate on in
Appendix Band also apply more broadly to consideration of any kind of imperfectly understood
policy instrument. All proofs are contained in Appendix C.

5

Veiga and Weyl (2016), for example, show that a monopolist's shrouded attribute strategy will depend on the

covariance between inattention to the shrouded attribute and household income.

6

Results on this general topic are mixed.

Abeler and Jäger (2015) nd that study participants underreact to

complex changes in an experimental income tax, but that this underreaction does not depend on the magnitude
of the change.

Feldman et al. (2015) nd no statistically signicant evidence that experimental subjects attend

dierently to an 8 percent and a 22 percent sales tax, although their condence intervals admit eect sizes of the
magnitude documented in this paper. In contrast, Hoopes et al. (2015) nd that taxpayers pay more attention to
capital-gains information when the payos to doing so are higher.

Interestingly, Feldman and Rue (2015) nd

asymmetric attention to comparable taxes and rebates. In tests of boundedly rational decision-making more broadly,
Caplin and Dean (2015b) and Caplin and Dean (2013) nd that study participants pay more attention to stimuli
when given higher incentives, in accordance with a general class of rational inattention models; Allcott (2011) and
Allcott (2015) show that consumers pay more attention to energy costs when gasoline prices are higher.

4

2.1 Set-up
2.1.1 Consumer and Producer Behavior
Consumers:

There is a unit mass of consumers who have unit demand for a good

remaining income on an untaxed composite good

u(y) + vx,

where

utility from

x.

x ∈ {0, 1}

Let

of the product, and

Z
t

y

(the numeraire). A person's utility is given by

denotes whether or not the good is purchased, and

denote the budget (assumed identical across consumers),
the tax set by the

A fully optimizing consumer chooses

7
policymaker.

x=1

where

θwhich

if and only if

may covary with

consumer under- (or over-) reacts to the

v

p

v

is the person's

the posted price

We assume throughout that

Z >> p + t.

u(Z − p − t) + v ≥ u(Z).

allow consumers to not process the tax fully. Instead, a consumer chooses

θt) + v ≥ u(Z),

x and spend their

or be endogenous to

x=1

However, we

when

tdenotes

u(Z − p −

how much the

8
tax.

Because we make minimal assumptions about the distribution of

θ,

this modeling approach

encompasses a number of psychological biases that may lead consumers to make mistakes in incorporating the sales tax into their decisions. These include:
1. Exogenous inattention to the tax, so that consumers always react to the tax as if it's a constant
fraction

θ

of its size (DellaVigna, 2009; Gabaix and Laibson, 2006).

2. Endogenous inattention to the tax, or boundedly rational processing more broadly, so that
consumers pay more attention to higher taxes (Chetty et al., 2007; Gabaix, 2014).
3. Incorrect beliefs, where a person perceives a tax

t

as

t̂.

In this case,

θ = t̂/t.

4. Rounding heuristics.
5. Forgetting about the tax.
6. Any combination of the above biases.
In practice, multiple mechanisms are likely to be in play. Existing data provides little guidance on
which mechanisms are the most important (CLK) or on the shape of the distribution of

θ.

Gabaix's

(2014) anchoring and adjustment model of attention, for example, predicts that each consumer will
have a

θ ∈ [0, 1),

with that value depending on the size of the tax. Other theories of inattention

may predict binary attention
variety of dierent values of

θ ∈ {0, 1}.

θ,

Incorrect beliefs and rounding heuristics can generate a

with instances in which

θ > 1.

We develop our theoretical and empirical framework to be robust to all of these possible mechanisms. Instead of dening

θ

in relation to a specic mechanism, we dene it by the behavior that

these mechanisms generate: a dierence in willingness to pay depending on the presence of a tax.

7

Note that we are assuming here that the policymaker is using a tax instrument with only one level of salience.

See Goldin (2015) for a model in which the policymaker can combine tax instruments of diering salience to raise
revenue in the least distortionary way possible.

8

We also assume that

Z > p + θt

for all

θ,

by virtue of our assumption that

5

Z >> p + t.

pmax (t)

For a given consumer, dene
purchase
tween

θ

x

at a tax

and

v

t.

Then

to be the highest posted price at which the consumer would

pmax (0)−pmax (t)
. We make no assumptions about the relation bet

θ :=

other than that their joint distribution

aggregate demand
not depend on

t.

9
curves,

that

θ≥0

Ft (v, θ)

generates smooth, downward-sloping

and is bounded, and that the marginal distribution of

By allowing the distribution of

θ

to depend on

t

V ar[θ|p, t] to be the mean

the product at
We let

and variance of

θ

does

we capture the possibility that

attention to taxes may depend on the tax rate. With minor abuse of notation, we dene
and

v

E[θ|p, t]

of consumers who are indierent about purchasing

(p, t).

D(p, t)

denote aggregate demand for

x

as a function of posted price

p

and sales tax

t.

and Dt denote partial derivatives with respect to the p and t, and we let εD,p (p, t) =
p+t
p+t
−Dp (p, t) D(p,t) and εD,t (p, t) = −Dt (p, t) D(p,t)
denote the elasticities with respect to p and t. We

We let

Dp

often suppress the arguments

p, t

in the elasticity to economize on notation.

To focus our analysis on mistakes arising solely from incorrect reactions to the sales tax, we
assume that 1) in the absence of taxes, consumers optimize perfectly and 2) consumers' utility
depends only on the nal consumption bundle
and our choice-based denition of
welfare analysis:

θ

(x, y).10

Welfare analysis under these two assumptions

is an application Bernheim and Rangel's (2009) approach to

we view choice in the presence of taxes as provisionally suspect, and we use

consumer choice in the absence of taxes as the welfare-relevant frame. We relax the rst assumption
in Appendix B, following models such as those in Lockwood and Taubinsky (2017) and Farhi and
Gabaix (2015).

Producers:
numeraire
and

We dene production identically to CLK: price-taking rms use

y to produce S

c00 (S) ≥ 0.

units of

x.

prot

at pretax price

p

and level of supply

Producers optimize perfectly so that the supply function for good

T OT
dene εD,t

=

·

x

S

is

c0 (S) > 0

pS − c(S).

is implicitly dened by the

p
− ∂S
∂p S(p) denote the price elasticity of supply.

p = c0 (S(p)).

d
− dt
D(p, t)

units of the

The marginal cost of production is weakly increasing:

The representative rm's

marginal condition

c(S)

We
Let εS,p =
p+t
D to be the total percent change in equilibrium demand (taking into

11

account changes in producer prices) caused by a one percent change in the tax.

9

The smoothness assumption may be violated in situations where these mechanisms follow threshold rules and

the thresholds are homogeneous. For example, if a positive mass of consumers always rounds a tax that is greater
than 7.5% to 10%, and rounds a tax smaller than 7.5% to 5%, then there would be a point of non-dierentiability in
the demand curve at a 7.5% tax. Relatedly, if all consumers either fully pay attention to the tax or not, and if the
tax threshold at which they start paying attention is the same for all consumers, non-dierentiability in the demand
curve may similarly be generated. However, as long as the thresholds applied for rounding or for paying attention
are smoothly distributed across consumers, as in the Chetty et al. (2007) model, the resulting demand curve will be
smooth.

10

Assumption 2 implies that we leave out cognitive costs from our eciency costs and welfare analysis. Although

there may be some cognitive costs associated with attention, we do not feel that we have enough evidence to condently
specify a theory of what they should be. Our welfare formulas can be readily extended by including an additional
term corresponding to cognitive costs.

For small taxes, however, cognitive costs generate a third-order, and thus

negligible, eciency cost (Chetty et al., 2007).

11

For clarity, we remind the reader that all elasticities with respect to the tax are elasticities given behavioral

biases, not the rational elasticities.

6

2.1.2 Eciency Cost of Taxation
We follow Auerbach (1985) in dening the excess burden of a tax for a market with heterogeneous
consumers.

u(y −

We let

px∗i (p, t, Z)

−

x∗i (p, t, Z)

i's choice of x ∈ {0, 1} and we let Vi (p, t, Z)
∗
vi xi (p, t, Z) denote the consumer's indirect utility function.

denote consumer

tx∗i (p, t, Z))

+

ei (p, t, V ),

We denote the consumer's expenditure function by
necessary to attain utility

V

under a price

p

and tax

t.

Let

=

which is the minimum wealth

Ri (t, Z) = tx∗i

denote the revenue

collected from this consumer. Excess burden is given by



[Z − e(p0 , 0, Vi (p(t), t, Z)) − Ri (t, Z)] + π0 − π1

EB =
i
where

π0 − π1

of taxes, and

is the change in producer prots,

p(t)

is the equilibrium price at tax

p0
t.

is the equilibrium market price in the absence

That is, excess burden is the sum of the change

in consumer surplus and producer surplus minus government revenue. With quasilinear utility and
xed producer prices (i.e., perfectly elastic supply) this is simply



i (vi

− p0 )(x∗i (p0 , t) − x∗i (p0 , 0)):

the loss in surplus that accrues from discouraging transactions in which the value of the product

v

exceeds it's marginal cost of production.
To clarify the key determinants of total excess burden, we write it as a function of two arguments,

t

and

Ft ,

to clarify its dependence on both the tax and the distribution of

increasing a tax from

t1

to

t2

θ.

The eciency costs of

can be decomposed into two eects:

EB(t2 , Ft2 ) − EB(t1 , Ft1 ) = [EB(t2 , Ft2 ) − EB(t1 , Ft2 )] + [EB(t1 , Ft2 ) − EB(t1 , Ft1 )]
{z
} |
{z
}
|
Direct distortion eects

(1)

"Nudge channel" distortion eects

The rst eect corresponds to the direct distortionary eect of the tax, holding the distribution of
bias constant. The second eect is the indirect eect that a tax has on excess burden by altering the
distribution of consumer bias. The second eect can be understood more broadly as the eciency
costs of a nudge that changes the distribution of consumer bias. To provide a clear exposition of
the economics of each of these two eects, we study the two eects in isolation before combining
them into one formula.

2.2 Direct Eciency Costs
For the results presented in the body of the paper, we assume that

u is linear (i.e., no income eects

are present), but we discuss the implications of income eects at the end of the section, and in more
detail in Appendix A.2.

Proposition 1. Suppose that Ft does not depend on t. Let p(t) denote the equilibrium price as a

function of t. Then

7

d
d
EB(t, Ft ) = −E[θ|p, t]t D(p(t), t) − V ar[θ|p, t]tDp (p(t), t)
dt
dt
OT
εTD,t
εD,t
V ar[θ|p, t]
= E[θ|p, t]tD(p(t), t)
+
tD(p(t), t)
p(t) + t
E[θ|p, t]
p(t) + t

(2)

Proposition 1 provides a general formula for the (direct) excess burden of a small tax
consumers are arbitrarily heterogeneous. When

V ar[θ|p, t] = 0,

t

when

the formula reduces to the formula

provided in CLK, which shows that the excess burden of the tax is proportional to

E[θ|p, t].

In the

simple framework without income eects, the more consumers ignore the tax, the less consumers
are discouraged from purchasing the product because of the tax, and thus the smaller the excess
burden. The formula, as written, does not feature the covariance between

θ

and

v

or between

θ

and

elasticities. However, we note that those covariances determine which consumers are on the margin,
and are thus incorporated into our

E[θ|p, t]

and

V ar[θ|p, t]

terms.

The general formula illustrates that it is not just how much people underreact to the tax on
average that matters, but also the variance of marginal consumers' underreactions.
stark example, suppose that
homogeneous with

θ = 0.25,

E[θ] = 0.25

for consumers on the margin.

To take a

When all consumers are

equation (2) shows that the excess burden from a marginal increase in

OT
εT
D,t
the tax is (0.25)tD(p, t)
p+t ; that is, the true excess burden is one quarter of what the neoclassical

analyst would compute using the tax elasticity of demand. Now, suppose that 25% of the marginal
consumers have

θ=1

case, we still have
since

OT .
εD,t ≥ εTD,t

while 75% have

E[θ] = 0.25,

θ = 0,

so that

E[θ] = 0.25

and

V ar[θ] = (0.75)(0.25).

but (2) implies that the excess burden is now

In this

at least tD(p, t)

OT
εT
D,t
p+t ,

Interestingly, this is greater than or equal to the inference that would be made

by an analyst who assumes that consumers optimize perfectly and thus uses the tax elasticity of
demand as a sucient statistic for calculating excess burden.
The intuition for this result is that heterogeneity in consumers' mistakes creates a market failure
that is conceptually distinct from the eect of a homogeneous mistake. If consumers are homogeneous in their underreaction to the tax, then for any quantity of products purchased, the allocation
of products to consumers is ecient: the product is still purchased by consumers who derive the
most value from it. When consumers are heterogeneous in their underreaction, however, there is
misallocation: the consumers purchasing the product are now not just the consumers who derive
the most value from it, but also consumers who underreact to taxes the most.

There is thus an

12

additional eciency cost from an inecient match between consumers and products.

Another important insight from Proposition 1 is that the eciency costs arising from misallocation depend on the elasticity of the demand curve, rather than on the elasticity of the

12

equilibrium

This point about misallocation and departure from traditional deadweight loss analysis can be obtained in some

neoclassical settings as well. Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) show that rent control not only distorts the equilibrium
quantity purchased, but also creates an allocational failure whereby properties are no longer purchased by the consumers who value them the most.
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x in the market.

quantity of

Thus measurement of (changes of ) the equilibrium quantity is not su-

cient to calculate eciency costs, even when combined with estimates of average underreactionthis
is in stark contrast to standard eciency cost of taxation results, as well as Chetty (2009)'s results
that allow endogenous producer prices but assume homogeneous underreaction. This is most clear
in the case of inelastic supply:

Corollary 1. Suppose that supply is inelastic (εS,p = 0) and that Ft does not depend on t. Then
εD,t
V ar(θ|p, t)
d
EB =
tD(p(t), t)
dt
E(θ|p, t)
p(t) + t
Corollary 1 shows that when supply is inelasticand thus the equilibrium quantity produced by
the market does not changethe excess burden of a small tax

t depends only on the variance of bias

and the price elasticity of demand. Intuitively, this is because all of the eciency cost is generated
by misallocation, the extent of which is proportional to the variance of

θwhich

quanties the

extent of individual dierencesand the price elasticity of demandwhich determines how much
the individual dierences translate to dierent purchase decisions.

That eciency costs can be

signicant even when supply is inelastic is in sharp contrast to standard results in public nance
that eciency costs should be zero if taxes do not distort the equilibrium quantity. More generally,
the results imply that when consumers are heterogeneous in their underreaction, eciency costs
will be signicantly higher than in the standard model when supply is relatively inelastic compared

13

to demand.

The formula in Proposition 1 can also be used to extend the classic Harberger (1964) secondorder approximations of the eciency costs of taxation. We begin by quantifying the eciency costs
of introducing a small tax

t into a previously untaxed market.

only direct eciency costs, it can be used to provide a
of introducing a small tax

t

Although Proposition 1 characterizes

complete characterization of the excess burden

in a previously untaxed market. Because the nudge channel distortion

eect is irrelevant when there are no pre-existing taxes (as per equation 1,

0),

EB(0, Ft ) − EB(0, F0 ) =

in this case the only relevant eciency costs are the direct eciency costs. We thus have:

Proposition 2. The excess burden of imposing a small tax (so terms of order
negligible) in a previously untaxed market is

t3

or higher are

"
#
OT
εTD,t
εD,p
1 2
EB(t, Ft ) ≈ t D E[θ|p, t]
+ V ar[θ|p, t]
2
p(t) + t
p(t) + t
13

Empirical work on how the supply elasticities compare to demand elasticities is scarce and has not settled on

a range.

Studies that estimate pass-through of salient consumption taxes (those included in the upfront price of
εS,p
the good) nd that the pass-through to the nal, after-tax pricegiven by ε
ranges from 19% to 48%
S,p −εD,p
(Benzarti and Carloni, 2016). Studies that estimate pass-through of not-fully-salient sales taxes into the after-tax
εS,p −(1−E[θ|p,t])εD,p
pricegiven by
nd estimates ranging from 70% to 100% (Besley and Rosen, 1999; Doyle and
ε
−ε
S,p

D,p

Samphantharak, 2008).
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The nudge distortion channel is not irrelevant when there are pre-existing taxes, but we now
use Proposition 1 to characterize the

direct

eciency costs of increasing pre-existing taxes.

We

maintain the standard assumptions of the Harberger Trapezoid formula (Harberger, 1964) that
for all

k ≥ 2,

the terms

t(∆t)k Dpp , t(∆t)k Spp , (∆t)k+1

are negligible. This assumption corresponds

to cases in which the demand and supply curves are approximately linear, or to cases in which both
the pre-existing tax

t and the change ∆t are suciently small (or a suitable combination of the two).

We also introduce one more technical assumption about smoothness in the family of conditional
distributions

F (v|θ):

Assumption A

For each

θ in the support of the distribution F , the conditional distribution F (v|θ)

has a dierentiable density function.

Proposition 3. Suppose that

for t2 = t1 + ∆t. Then, if for all k ≥ 2 the
are negligible, and if assumption A holds, the excess burden

Ft1 = Ft2 ≡ F

terms
,
pp ,
of increasing the tax from t1 to t2 is
t(∆t)k D

t(∆t)k Spp

(∆t)k+1




(∆t)2
d
EB(t2 , F ) − EB(t1 , F ) ≈ −
t1 ∆t +
E[θ|p(t1 ), t1 ] D(p(t), t)|t=t1 + V ar[θ|p(t1 ), t1 ]Dp (p(t1 ), t1 )
2
dt


2

D(p(t1 ), t1 )
(∆t)
OT
E[θ|p(t1 ), t1 ]εTD,t
+ V ar[θ|p(t1 ), t1 ]εD,p
=
t1 ∆t +
2
p(t1 ) + t1
Like Proposition 1, Proposition 3 shows that the standard formula is modied in two ways. First, the
change in the equilibrium quantity,

d
dt D(p(t), t)|t=t1 , is now multiplied by the average

θ

of marginal

consumers. Second, increasing taxes increases misallocation of products to consumers, which leads
to a new term given by the product of the variance of

θ

and the price elasticity of demand.

2.3 Indirect Eciency Costs: The Consequences of Debiasing
In this section, we provide Harberger-type formulas for the eciency costs (or benets) of changing
the distribution of

θ.

We keep the tax xed, and we consider a family of distributions

are smooth functions of

n

for all

θ, v .

We think of

n

Fn (θ, v)

that

as the nudge parameter, and we ask how the

excess burden of a tax changes as we shift this parameter by some small amount from

n

to

n + ∆n.

The formulas here serve as an intermediate step to the nal formulas that we derive in Section 2.4,
but we also view them to be of independent interest as a novel extension of the standard public
nance toolbox. We provide results under two additional assumptions:

Assumption B

Fn (h(θ, n), v) = F0 (θ, v), where h is dierentiable in θ

Assumption C

The terms

k

∂
tk+1 ∂p
kD

are negligible for all

and

n, and

∂
∂n h is bounded.

k ≥ 2.

Assumption B requires that the nudge smoothly changes the distribution of

θ.

Assumption C

k
is a variation of the standard Harberger formula assumption that the term t(∆t) Dpp is negligible,
but is a slightly stronger requirement on how small

10

t

or

Dpp

needs to be.

To appreciate the need for placing additional structure on the distributions, consider the diculty of generally estimating eciency costs in the seemingly simple case in which
two possible values,

θ1

and

θ2 ,

burden arising from the type

θ2

and is distributed independently of

θi

θ

have no way of quantifying

EBi (t)

Let

takes on just

denote the excess

consumers. The eciency cost of increasing the measure of type

consumers by some small amount

the demand curve of each

v.

θ

dn

is then

(EB2 (t) − EB1 (t))dn.

is highly nonlinear so that each

EB2 (t) − EB1 (t)

to relate the demand curves of the dierent

θ

θ

type's

But if

price

t

is not small and

elasticity is dierent, we

in terms of observables. Further structure is needed
types in terms of observables.

The additional structure provided by Assumptions B and C essentially ensures a good t from
a quadratic approximation for the eciency costs corresponding to each
elasticities of demand are not too dierent across the

θ

θ

type, and that the price

types.

F
For the results in this section, we let D n denote the demand curve under
denote the expectation operator with respect to

Fn .

Fn

and let

EFn

To simplify exposition, we will also assume

that producer prices are xed.

Proposition 4. Suppose that producer prices are xed (εS,p = ∞), and that Assumptions A-C are

satised. Then
1.

d
dn EB(t, Fn )

 2
d
≈ − dn
EFn [θ2 |p, t] t2 DpFn .

2. If for all k ≥ 3 the terms (∆n)k are negligible then

1
EB(t, Fn+∆n ) − EB(t, Fn ) ≈ − t2 EFn+∆n [θ2 |p, t] − EFn [θ2 |p, t] DpFn
2
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is straightforward. As we have already established, eciency
costs depend on both the mean and the variance of

θ.

Consequently, the welfare impacts of a nudge

should correspond to how the nudge impacts the mean and variance of
of Proposition 4, as

θ.

This is exactly the result

E[θ2 |p, t] = E[θ|p, t]2 + V ar[θ|p, t].

2.4 Total Eciency Costs
We now combine our results from Sections 2.2 and 2.3 to quantify the total eciency costs of
taxation. As in Section 2.3, we focus on xed producer prices to simplify exposition.

Proposition 5. Consider two taxes

and t2 = t1 + ∆t. Suppose that producer prices are xed
(εS,p = ∞) and that Assumptions A-C are satised for the family of distributions Ft indexed by the
tax t. Suppose also that for k ≥ 2, the terms t(∆t)k Dpp and (∆t)k are negligible. Then
t1




(∆t)2
EB(t2 , Ft2 ) − EB(t1 , Ft1 ) ≈ − t1 (∆t) +
E[θ|p, t2 ]2 + V ar[θ|p, t2 ] Dp
2
 2

t1
−
E[θ2 |p, t2 ] − E[θ2 |p, t1 ] Dp
2
11

(3)

(4)

Proposition 5 is essentially a combination our earlier results about the direct eciency costs
of a tax and our results about the eciency costs of a nudge. Line (3) corresponds to the direct
eciency costs (as in Proposition 3), while (4) corresponds to the nudge channel eciency costs (as
in Proposition 4).
The formula in Proposition 5 is written in its most compact form using the

price

elasticity of

demand. One might be tempted to think that using tax elasticities could eliminate additional terms
corresponding to costs of debiasing, since the tax elasticity captures both the direct and indirect
eects that increasing a tax has on demand. However, simply using the tax-elasticity version of the
direct eciency costs formula in Proposition 3 will still not account for all of the eciency costs,
because it is not just the change in demand that matters, but also how the values

v

of the marginal

types change. We clarify in the corollary below.

Corollary 2. Under the assumptions of Proposition 5, and the assumption that the approximations
and V ar[θ|p, t2 ] − V ar[θ|p, t1 ] ≈ ∆t dtd V ar[θ|p, t]|t=t1 are
valid, eciency costs can also be expressed as
d
E[θ|p, t]|t=t1
E[θ|p, t2 ] − E[θ|p, t1 ] ≈ ∆t dt


EB(t2 , Ft2 ) − EB(t1 , Ft1 ) ≈

t1 (∆t) +

(∆t)2
2

p + t1




D  E[θ|p, t ] + E[θ|p, t ]
V ar[θ|p, t1 ] + V ar[θ|p, t2 ]
1
2
εD,t +
εD,p
2
2

D
1
t1 (∆t + t1 )
(V ar[θ|p, t2 ] − V ar[θ|p, t1 ]) εD,p
2
p + t1

t1 (∆t) D
E[θ|p, t2 ]2 − E[θ|p, t1 ]2 εD,p
4 p + t1

+
+

To illustrate the formula in the corollary, suppose that

0.

In this case, eciency costs are not simply given by

θ

is homogeneous, so that

t1 (∆t) +

(∆t)2 /2



V ar[θ|p, t] =

D
p+t1 E[θ|p, t1 ]εD,t , as

would be prescribed by Proposition 3. There are additional eciency costs, arising from the nudge
eect, given by

t1 (∆t) D
4
p+t1


E[θ|p, t2 ]2 − E[θ|p, t1 ]2 εD,p .

In the simple case of

V ar[θ|p, t] = 0,

these

additional eciency costs correspond to the fact that the value of the product to the marginal
consumer under

t2

is not simply

underreaction, but is instead

p + E[θ|p, t1 ](t1 + ∆t),

p + E[θ|p, t2 ](t1 + ∆t).

as it would be if taxes did not change

That is, in contrast to the standard model, the

value of the product to the marginal consumer is a convex, rather than a linear function of the tax
when

E[θ|p, t]

is increasing in

t.

2.5 Extensions and Optimal Tax Implications
Optimal Ramsey and Pigouvian Taxes

The formulas we present for quantifying how changes

in the tax aect welfare or excess burden have direct implications for optimal taxes. In Appendix
B we derive optimal tax formulas in a Ramsey framework, using a more general model that allows
for other market frictions arising from either externalities or other imperfections in consumer choice
(i.e., the possibility that consumers misoptimize even in the absence of taxes or that they spend
their remaining income suboptimally on the composite untaxed good).
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In formalizing the implications of our excess burden calculations for optimal taxes, the results
in the appendix generate several new insights. First, when there are no other market frictions and
taxes are used only to meet a xed revenue requirement, the optimal tax system may deviate from
the canonical Ramsey inverse elasticity rule in several ways. If people underreact less to taxes on
more expensive products, that implies that other things equal, the tax rates on bigger ticket items
should be smaller. Holding product prices constant, the inverse elasticity rule is also dampened if

θ

is on average increasing in the tax.

This is because increasing taxes increases deadweight loss

through the additional debiasing channel.
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Second, we characterize how taxes depend on other market imperfections, and consider whether
a less salient tax is optimal for the policymaker, building on the analysis in Farhi and Gabaix (2015).
When there is no variation in

θ, underreaction to the tax is always benecial, even in the presence of

externalities (or internalities). Because the consumers who buy the product are still those who value
it the most, any not-fully-salient tax can still be set high enough to achieve the socially optimal
consumption of

x.

With variation in

θ,

however, the more salient tax is better if the externality

is suciently large relative to the value of public funds. This is because introducing a not-fullysalient tax causes misallocation and therefore cannot achieve the socially optimal consumption of

x.

Our general message about the importance of taking into account the misallocation arising from

heterogeneity in

θ

Income Eects

is thus particularly relevant in the presence of other market frictions.

We have thus far assumed that

u(y)

is linear, imposing an absence of income

eects. This is a reasonable assumption for small-ticket items for which

p and t are small relative to

income. Relaxing this assumption complicates our analyses, but follows the same principles as the
baseline excess burden formula without income eects. As we show in Appendix A.2, the formulas
we derive in the body of the paper still hold in the presence of income eects when either 1) the
taxed product is a small share of consumers' expenditures or 2) the taxed product is purchased on
a reasonably frequent basis, and the consumer can observe his budget in between the purchases.
Thus for common household commodities, we believe that our results hold robustly in the presence
of income eects.
However, for infrequent, large-ticket purchases there can still be eciency costs when consumers
ignore the tax fully. This can occur when a consumer spends more money than he realizes on the
product in question, and then consumes ineciently too little

y

in the future after he is surprised by

a smaller budget. For large-ticket purchases, this process of budget adjustment can become quantitatively important, and we note that this process is not incorporated into the analyses presented
here. For related discussion, see Reck (2014).
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We perform these calculations under the assumption that there are no cross-price eects. While this assumption

is common in excess burden analyses, it can be reasonably viewed as limiting. However, the broad concepts developed
in this paper apply even when this assumption is relaxed. When people homogeneously underreact to a tax on one
product, shifting that tax will dampen the, e.g., substitution to other products.

Heterogeneity similarly creates

additional misallocation through the cross-price eect, as the people substituting will sometimes be the wrong ones.
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Distributional concerns

In Appendix A.3 we also extend our framework to incorporate dis-

tributional concerns. We show that with redistributive concerns, the relative regressivity costs of
not-fully-salient sales taxes, as compared to fully salient sales taxes, are determined by how the
mistakesgiven by

(θi − 1)2

and reecting either under or over-reaction to the taxcovary across

the income distribution.

2.6 Identication from Aggregate Demand Data
What kinds of datasets identify the statistics necessary for welfare analysis?

CLK and Chetty

(2009) show that for a representative consumer, the generalized demand curve
excess burden when pre-existing taxes are small. Under these assumptions,
average degree of underreaction to taxes relative to prices,

θ

D(p, t)

identies

is identied by the

Dt (p, t)/Dp (p, t).

In Appendix A.1 we prove two main results about identication of eciency costs under more
general assumptions. First, we focus on the case in which
show that when

θ

is degenerate for all

p, t,

and

is endogenous to the tax rate, locally-estimated elasticities no longer identify

or excess burden, although full knowledge of
demand responses

F (θ|p, t)

Dt /Dp

when the distribution of

is roughly equal to

θ

D(p, t)

θ

does. Intuitively, this is because the ratio of

d
E[θ|p, t]t, and thus identies E[θ|p, t] only
E[θ|p, t] + dt

does not depend on

t.

Thus datasets containing only local variation in

t

are not sucient for questions about the eciency costs of non-negligible increases in sales taxes.
Second, we show that if

θ

can be heterogeneous, conditional on

identify the dispersion, and thus welfare. While the average
the variance of

θ

θ

p

and

t,

is identied by

then

D(p, t)

Dt /Dp

can never

for small taxes,

is left completely unidentied. These results show that key questions about the

variation of underreaction to taxes cannot be identied from existing data sources. This motivates
our experimental design.

3 Experimental Design
Platform

The experiment was implemented through

ClearVoice Research, a market research rm

that maintains a large and demographically diverse panel of participants over the age of 18. This
platform is frequently used by rms who ship products to consumers to elicit product ratings, but
is additionally available to researchers for academic use (for other examples of research using this
platform, see, e.g., Benjamin et al. 2014; Rees-Jones and Taubinsky 2016). Two key features of this
platform make it appropriate for our experimental design. First, ClearVoice provides samples that
match the US population on basic demographic characteristics. Second, ClearVoice maintains an
infrastructure for easily shipping products to consumers, which facilitates an incentive-compatible
online-shopping experiment.

Overview

Figure 1 provides a synopsis of the experimental design. The design had four parts:

1) elicitation of residential information, 2) module 1 shopping decisions, 3) module 2 shopping

14

decisions, and 4) end-of-study survey questions. The design is both within-subjectwe vary tax
rates for a given consumer between modules 1 and 2and between-subjectconsumers face dierent
tax rates in module 1. Decisions are incentivized: study participants have a chance to receive a $20
shopping budget to actually enact their purchasing decisions, and ClearVoice ships any products
purchased. Subjects retain any unspent portion of the budget. The within-subject aspect of the
design increases statistical power and provides identication that is not possible from betweensubject aggregate data.
Each consumer was randomly assigned to one of three arms:
standard-tax arm, and 3) the triple-tax arm.

1) the no-tax arm, 2) the

The standard- and triple-tax arms were im-

plemented to provide within-subject comparisons of purchasing decisions with and without taxes.
The no-tax arm was implemented to identify any order eects on valuations over the course of the

15

experiment and to help test for demand or anchoring eects.

Each module consisted of a series of shopping decisions involving 20 common household products.
In module 1, consumers made shopping decisions with either a zero tax rate (no-tax arm), a standard
tax rate corresponding to their city of residence (standard-tax arm), or a tax rate equal to triple
their standard tax rate (triple-tax arm). In module 2, consumers in all three arms made decisions
in the absence of any sales taxes. The same 20 products were used in each module and in each arm
of the experiment. The order in which the 20 products were presented was randomly determined,
and independent between the two modules.
Our experimental design involves language about the sales tax rate that study participants pay
in their city of residence. To avoid confusion, we asked ClearVoice to only recruit panel members
from states that have a positive sales tax. This excluded panel members from Alaska, Montana,
Delaware, New Hampshire, and Oregon. The remaining 45 states are all represented in our nal
sample. Prior to learning the details of the experiment, consumers were asked to report their state,
county, and city of residence.

To correctly determine the money spent in the experiment, this

information was matched to a dataset of tax rates in all cities in the United States.
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This design is closely related to several recent experimental studies of tax salience (e.g., Feldman
and Rue 2015; Feldman et al. 2015), but diers in important ways. Our design combines withinsubject manipulation of tax rates with a pricing mechanism that elicits full and precise demand
curves.

This design, combined with our unusually large sample size, allows us to infer the su-

cient statistics of our general welfare formulasan exercise not possible with previous experimental
designs.
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An additional goal of the no-tax arm was to identify the distribution of random shocks to valuations between

module 1 and module 2, and to combine this with data from the other two arms to deconvolve the distribution of
individual

θ

parameters from the distribution of measurement error. Ultimately, the variance of the measurement

error we encountered was too high to permit a well-powered deconvolution of this type.
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Local tax rate data is drawn from the April, 2015 update of the zip2tax tax calculator.
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Purchasing Decisions

Each product appeared on a separate screen.

For each product, con-

sumers saw a picture and a product description drawn from Amazon.com. Consumers then used a
slider to select the highest

tag price

at which they would be willing to purchase the product. It was

explained that The tag price is the price that you would nd posted on an item as you walk down
the aisle of the store; this is dierent from the nal amount that you would pay when you check
out at the register, which would be the tag price, plus any relevant sales taxes.

Figure 2 shows

examples of the decision screen.
If a study participant selected the highest price on the slider, $15, he was directed to an additional
screen where he was asked a hypothetical free-response question about the highest tag price at which
they would be willing to buy the product.
The three dierent decision environments were described to consumers as follows:

•

No-tax decision environment:

In the

no-tax

decisions consumers were told that In contrast to

what shopping is like at your local store, no sales tax will be added to the tag price at which
you purchase a product. It was explained that You can imagine this to be like the case if
there were no sales tax, or if sales tax were already included in the prices posted at a store.
As depicted in Figure 1, the no-tax decisions constituted the second module that consumers
encountered in each experimental arm, and also the rst module that consumers encountered
in the no-tax arm.

•

Standard-tax decision environment:

For the

standard-tax

decisions the instructions prior to

decisions were that The sales tax in this section of the study is the same as the standard sales
tax that you pay (for standard nonexempt items) in your city of residence, [city], [state]. The
standard-tax decisions constituted the rst module of the standard-tax arm.

•

Triple-tax decision environment:

For the

triple-tax

decisions the instructions prior to decisions

were that The sales tax in this section of the study is equal to triple the standard sales tax
that you pay (for standard nonexempt items) in your city of residence, [city], [state].

The

triple-tax decisions constituted the rst module that consumers encountered in the triple-tax
arm.
To make this experimental shopping experience as close as possible to the normal shopping experience and to enable tests for incorrect beliefs, consumers were not told what tax rate applies in
their city of residence.

Once consumers read the instructions (and answered the comprehension

questions), they were never reminded of the taxes again in the tax modules. In contrast, the no-tax
modules emphasized the absence of taxes to ensure that choices in those models reect consumers'
true willingness to pay for the products.

Product Selection

To arrive at the nal list of 20 household products, we began with a list of

75 potential items in the $0 to $15 price range compiled by a research assistant. From this list, we
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eliminated items that were tax exempt in at least one state. We then ran a pre-test with ClearVoice
to elicit (hypothetical) willingness to pay for the items. We selected 20 items that had unimodal
distributions of valuations and had the least censoring at $0 and $15. Appendix F lists the products,
prices, and Amazon.com product descriptions that were displayed to study participants.

Incentive Compatibility

Decisions in the experiment were incentive compatible.

All study

participants who passed the necessary comprehension questions (described below) had a 1/3 chance
of being selected to receive a $20 budget; accounting for the probability of failing the comprehension
check, this chance was approximately 1/4. Participants were informed of this incentive structure
prior to making any decisions, but they did not know if they received the budget until they completed
the experiment. If they did not receive the budget, they simply received a compensation of $1.50
and no products from the study. Consumers who were selected to receive the $20 budget had one out
of the forty decisions (from modules 1 and 2 combined) selected to be played out. Outcomes were
determined using the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak (BDM) mechanism. A random tag price, between 0
and 15, was drawn. If the randomly generated price was below the maximum tag price the consumer
was willing to pay, then the product was sold to the consumer at that tag price
of

p(1 + τ )

(where

τ

p, and a nal amount

is the experimentally induced tax rate) was subtracted from this consumer's

budget. The product was shipped to the consumer by ClearVoice, and the remainder of the budget
was included in experimental compensation. Participants received a full explanation of the BDM
mechanism, and were also told that it was in their best interest to always be honest about the
highest tag price at which they would want to buy the product.

Comprehension Questions

It is important to ensure that study participants understand the

experimental tax rate that applies to their decisions, so that the appearance of underreaction is
not generated by a simple failure to read experimental instructions. In both module 1 and module
2, we thus gave study participants a multiple-choice comprehension question designed to conrm
their understanding of the applicable experimental tax rate. This question presents an item being
purchased for a $5 tag price, and asks the respondent to choose the amount of money that would
be deducted from their budget from several tag-price/tax combinations. In both modules, the quiz
question appeared on the same screen as the instructions for that module. Subjects who fail these
questions are generally excluded from our analyses; however, we demonstrate that our main analyses
are robust to alternative treatments of these subjects in Section 4.7.

Survey Questions

After completing the main part of the experiment, study participants received

a short set of questions eliciting household income, marital status, nancial literacy, ability to
compute taxes, and health habits. We discuss these questions in further detail in the analysis.
ClearVoice also collects and shares various demographic information on its panel members,
including educational attainment, occupation, age, sex, and ethnicity. We report these basic demo-
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graphics in Section 4.1.

4 Quantifying Underreaction Across Dierent Tax Sizes
4.1 Sample Selection, Demographics, and Balance
In this section, we discuss the creation of our nal sample for analysis.

We then analyze the

demographic properties and balance of that sample.
A total of 4,328 consumers completed the experiment. For our primary analyses, we restrict our
sample to the 3,066 respondents who correctly answered the instruction-comprehension questions
regarding the tax rate that applied in both module 1 and module 2. Unsurprisingly, the 29% of
consumers who failed these comprehension questions do not react to the dierences in taxes across
conditions. Thus, while these respondents would contribute to evidence of underreaction to sales
taxes, we believe the misoptimization these consumers exhibit is likely due to misunderstanding
of our experimental manipulation.

This type of misunderstanding is conceptually distinct from
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misunderstanding a given tax rate and is not the object of interest in our theoretical analysis.

Out of the remaining 3,066 consumers, 30 consumers were not willing to buy at any positive price
in at least one of their decisions. Because our primary estimates are formed using the logarithm of
the ratio of module 1 and module 2 prices, we cannot use at least one observation for each of these
30 consumers. We thus exclude them from analysis as well. We additionally exclude 10 consumers
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who reported living in a state with no sales tax.

In part due to our pretest for product selection, only 0.9% of all responses were censored at
$15. For responses that were censored, we use consumers' uncensored responses to the hypothetical
question about the maximum tag price. However, this question did not force a response, and 28
consumers did not provide an answer to this question upon encountering it.

We exclude these

consumers as well, leaving us with a nal sample size of 2,998.
Table 1 presents a summary of the demographics of our nal sample. All participants in the
nal sample are over the age of 18, and all but 31 participants are over the age of 21. Experimental
recruitment was targeted to generate a nal sample approximating the gender, income, and age
distribution of the United States. As a result, our samplewhich is 48% male, has a median income
of $50,000, and average age of 50is similar to the US population on these basic demographics.
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We also included questions to check if participants understood the BDM mechanism. 78% of participants passed

those comprehension questions, and we show in Appendix E.7 that our results are robust to restricting to this
sample. We are far less concerned about potential misunderstanding of the pricing mechanism for two reasons. First,
participants were clearly instructed that it was in their best interest to always truthfully report the maximum tag
price at which they would be willing to buy the product. Second, most forms of strategic price reporting do not
confound estimates of

θ.

While subjects might report a threshold for purchase that is not their true willingness to

pay, this threshold should be a function of nal price. Dierences in the reported threshold across conditions may
still be interpreted as evidence of dierential weighting of posted price and sales taxes.
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These 10 consumers were erroneously recruited for the study because they had recently changed residence and

that information was not yet updated in ClearVoice's records.
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Despite this favorable comparison, we caution the reader that the nature of recruitment into the
ClearVoice panel likely induces selection on unobservable characteristics.
We nd no evidence of selection on demographic covariates across experimental arms. We fail
to reject the null hypotheses of equality of the demographics in table 1 when comparing Arm 1 vs.
Arm 2 (F -test

p = 0.49), Arm 2 vs.

Arm 3 (F -test

p = 0.94) or Arm 1 vs.

Arm 3 (F -test

p = 0.36).

In contrast to the demographic results, there are statistically signicant cross-arm dierences in
the likelihood that consumers pass the comprehension questions regarding the tax rate that apply
in the experiment. The likelihoods of correctly answering both comprehension questions are 78%,
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70%, and 65% in the no-tax, standard-tax, and triple-tax arms, respectively.

The null hypothesis

of equal pass rates is rejected for any pair of arms at the 5% signicance level.

The dierential

selection introduced by these diering pass rates introduces a potentially important confound to
cross-arm inference. However, we will show in Section 4.7 that our primary results are robust to
both worst-case assumptions about dierential selection and to the reinclusion of those failing the
test.

4.2 Summary of Behavior
We begin with a graphical summary of the data. Figure 3 provides a summary of the demand curves
as functions of before- or after-tax prices. To construct the gure, we start with demand curves

DkC ,m (p)

for each product

module, and
plotting the

p

k,

where C

the before-tax price.

∈{0x,

1x, 3x} denotes the experimental arm,

m

denotes the

Because there are 20 products, we summarize the data by

C,m
average demand curves Davg
(p) :=

1
20

P

k

DkC,m (p)

for each arm

C

and module

m.

Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows that consumers do react to sales taxes in module 1, as their willingness
to buy at a given before-tax price is decreasing in the size of the sales tax. However, as shown in
panel (b), consumers do not react to taxes as much as perfect optimization would require. In this
panel, we construct the demand curves that would be expected if consumers reacted to the taxes
fully, and nd substantially larger dierences than those observed in panel (a). As demonstrated
in panel (c), this discrepancy results in dierences in demand curves across treatment arms when
they are plotted as a function of after-tax price: consumers are willing to buy at higher nal prices
in the presence of larger taxes.
While consumers in the dierent treatment arms behave dierently in module 1, panel (d) shows
that all treatment arms exhibit similar demand patterns in module 2. This pattern is conrmed
by several statistical tests. For our rst test, we compute an average pre-tax price
for each consumer
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i,

and then compare the distributions of

p̄i .

p̄i =

1
20

P

k

pik

Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests nd no

To provide further detail, the fraction of people correctly identifying the applicable tax rate in module 1 was

81%, 82%, and 66%, in the no-tax, standard-tax, and triple-tax arms, respectively. In module 2, the corresponding
rates were 87%, 80%, and 84%. Conditional on correctly answering the module 1 question, the likelihood of correctly
answering the module 2 question was 96%, 86%, and 97%, respectively. Note, in particular, that while the module 1
question was of approximate equal diculty in the no-tax and standard-tax arms, the likelihood of answering both
module 1 and module 2 questions correctly was signicantly higher in the no-tax arm. We believe this is because the
tax rate, and thus the correct answer to the comprehension question, changed in one arm, but not the other.
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dierences in the

p̄i

triple-tax arms (p

between the no-tax and standard-tax arms (p

= 0.29),

= 0.73),

between the no-tax and

and between the standard-tax and triple-tax arms (p

= 0.50).20

OLS

and quantile regressions comparing the average willingness to pay in module 2 across experimental
arms similarly detect no dierences (see Appendix E.1). Since all three treatment arms face the
same no-tax environment in module 2, this similarity of demand behavior is reassuring: it suggests
that the willingness to pay elicited in module 2 is not contaminated by earlier cross-arm dierences,
as could arise in the presence of anchoring or demand eects.
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4.3 Econometric Framework
We now present our baseline econometric framework for studying how underreaction to taxes varies
by experimental condition and by observable characteristics.
subject

i

is willing to pay in module 1 for product

k,

and dene

ik ik
that in the absence of noise or order eects, p2 /p1
underreaction to the tax on product

k

pik
1

Let

pik
2

be the highest tag price a

analogously for module 2. Note

= 1 + θik τi ,

where

by consumer i. Thus for a consumer

1 − θik

is the degree of

i in either the standard-

y
or triple-tax arms, ik ≈ θik , where τi is the tax rate faced by the consumer in module 1 and
τi
ik
yik = log(p2 ) − log(pik
1 ).
yik
Of course,
τi provides a noisy estimate of θik because study participants' reported values for
the product uctuate.

Furthermore, this measure may be biased if average perceived values of

the products vary between module 1 and module 2 even in the absence of tax changes.
phenomenonwhich we refer to as

order eects is

This

commonly found in pricing experiments (see,

e.g., Andersen et al., 2006; Clark and Friesen, 2008), and the no-tax arm of the experiment was
designed to allow us to identify and econometrically accommodate these eects. In this arm, we
nd that participants' valuations declined by an average of 42 cents from module 1 to module 2
(p

< 0.001).

Our econometric approach incorporates these order eects and allows them to depend

on any estimated covariates, but we assume that order eects do not vary by experimental arm. This
assumption, labeled A1 below for reference, allows us to extrapolate the estimated order eects from
the no-tax arm to the other tax arms, in which the identication of order eects would otherwise
be confounded with the variation in tax rates between module 1 and 2.

A1

For any vector of covariates

For a vector of covariates
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Xik

By contrast, the corresponding

Xik , E[yik − log(1 + θik τi )|Xik ]

does not depend on

τi .

we will estimate the following model:

p-values

for module 1 are

p = 0.12

,

p < 0.001, p < 0.001.

Note that these tests

are less powerful than our measures of reaction to taxes in Section 4.4, which make use of within-subject identication
provided by both modules.
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By anchoring we mean that consumers might underreport willingness to pay in the standard and triple-tax arms

due to the psychological inuence of previously reporting a lower module 1 price. By demand eects we mean that
consumers might react more strongly to the absence of taxes in module 2 of the experiment because they perceive
this to be an experiment about how they are supposed to choose dierently in the dierent modules.

Either of

E[θ],

since they

these confounds would lead the module 2 demand curves to dier. This would bias our estimates of
rely on within-subject comparisons of module 1 to module 2 prices.
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E[yik |X] = log(1 + θik τi ) + βXik

log(1 + θik τi )
|Xik
= αXik
E[θik |Xik ] ≈ E
τi


The model above implies the following moment conditions:



0
E Xik



0
0
E[Xik
yik ] = Xik
βXik

yik − βXik
0
= Xik
αXik
τi

for no-tax arm

(5)

for std./triple-tax arms

Equation (5) identies any order eects in the data using the no-tax arm.

yik

are partialed out from
estimate

E[θik ]

(6)

These order eects

in the standard and triple-tax arms in equation (6), which allows us to

as a linear function of covariates

Xik .

When estimating (5) and (6) for either the

standard or triple-tax arm separately, the system of equations is exactly identied. When pooling
data from multiple treatment arms, we will assume that (6) holds independently for each arm, but
with a common

α.

The system is thus over-identied, and we use the two-step GMM estimator

to obtain an approximation to the ecient weighting matrix. We will often condition on
(typically

pik
2 ≥ 1)i.e.,

pik
2 ≥ p

focusing analysis on those with non-negligible willingness to payas a

means of increasing precision. Because most of our analysis takes

p2 /p1

as an object of interest,

noisiness in responses can generate dramatic variation in this quantity when valuations approach
zero. All of our point estimates are robust to the inclusion of all data.
Although our approach may seem somewhat complicated, we show in Appendix E.6 that all of
our main results are robust to a simpler approach, using OLS to regress

yik

on the tax rate. As we

elaborate in that appendix, however, we prefer our GMM approach as it avoids the need to assume
that mean underreaction is constant across tax sizes within an experimental arman assumption
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that our results refute.

4.4 Average Underreaction to Taxes by Experimental Arm
Table 2 presents our estimates of average

θ

in each arm using the econometric framework presented

in Section 4.3. We provide estimates using all data, as well as conditioning on
Across all specications, we estimate an average

22

Note, also, that in principle, we could have used

our approach because using the raw ratio

θ

of approximately

ik
pik
2 −p1
instead of
τi pik
1

yik

0.25

pik
2 ≥1

and

pik
2 ≥ 5.

in the standard-tax arm

as the dependent variable.

We prefer

ik
pik
2 /p1

gives more weight to outliers, and thus the estimates are unduly
ik
ik
inuenced by the inclusion or exclusion of the top 1% of values of p2 /p1 . Because of this extreme right tail of
ik
ik
the distribution of p2 /p1 , a strategy for decreasing the weight on extreme realizations is necessary to stabilize the
estimates. Estimates in our preferred specication using the log transformation are very similar to the estimates that
pik −pik
are obtained after winsorizing at least the top 1% of values of 2 ik1 for each arm.
τi p1
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and an average

θ of approximately 0.5 in the triple-tax arm.23

Due to advantages of our design, these

estimates are notably more precise than those of prior work and strongly reject the null hypotheses
that consumers completely neglect or completely attend to taxes.
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All the estimates are more

precise in the second and third columns than in the rst column, as the ratio

ik
pik
2 /p1

is naturally

most noisy when a consumer attaches low value to the product. We will thus continue conditioning
on

pik
2 ≥1

throughout the rest of our analysis.

The dierence in average

ik
when conditioning on p2

θ

≥ 1,

between the arms is signicant at the 5% level when using all data or
and it is signicant at the 0.1% level when conditioning on

25
pik
2 ≥ 5.

4.5 Further Tests of Endogenous Attention
Our baseline results suggest that consumers attend more to higher taxes. However, several important
caveats apply.

Consumers might overreact to the triple tax if they are surprised by the unusual

scenario (Bordalo et al., 2017).

This suggests that a measurement of average

θ

shortly after a

real or experimentally induced tax change might overestimate the degree of attention that would
be realized after the resolution of surpise.

On the other hand, our estimates of average

θ

in the

triple-tax arm may underestimate long-run attention because it may take time for people to update
their heuristics in a modied decision environment.
A complementary analysis that could test for long-run response would be to estimate whether
consumers are more attentive in states with larger sales taxes. However, since the variation in tax
rates across states is substantially lower than the tripling of taxes considered in our experiment, such
an analysis would require a sample size that is approximately 45 times larger than ours to be wellpowered. Unfortunately, such a test cannot currently be feasibly implemented with a lab-in-eld

26

approach like our own.
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θ of marginal consumers, E[θ|p, t]. In
E[E[θ|p, t]] = E[θ], averaging this value across

Note that the relevant statistic in our welfare formula is the average

contrast, the estimates presented here are the iterated expectation

dierent possible margins. We show in Section 4.5 that, because market prices are slightly higher than the median
price at which consumers are on the margin, and because consumers pay more attention to larger taxes, the average

θ

of consumers on the margin at existing market prices is similar, but slightly higher, than the unconditional averages

E[θ]
24

reported here.

CLK's estimates of

θ

are calculated by drawing estimates from several dierent regressions, and standard errors

are not reported. To approximate the relevant standard errors for comparison to our own, we apply the delta method
using the reported standard errors of each input estimate and assuming no covariance between them. This results in
an estimated standard error for

θ

of 0.18 in the grocery store experiment and of 0.67 in the observational study of

demand for alcoholic beverages, compared to point estimates of 0.35 and 0.06, respectively.
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Feldman, Goldin and Homono (2015, henceforth FGH) run a complementary lab experiment with 227 Princeton

students to study purchasing behavior at a 8% vs.

a 22% sales tax rate, similar to our standard- vs.

triple-tax

conditions. The three arms of the FGH experiment are similar in structure to ours, although there are important
dierences that prevent direct comparability. While the FGH experiment was not designed to identify average θ by
1−E[θ|8%]
experimental condition (or by covariates), the statistic that the FGH design does allow estimation of is 1−E[θ|22%] ,
where

E[θ|x%]

is the average

θ

in the condition with an

x%

tax rate. This statistic is estimated to be 0.4 with a
1−E[θ|standard]
to be
1−E[θ|triple]

standard error of 0.75, and a 95% condence interval of [0,1.86]. By comparison, we estimate

1.42

with a standard error of 0.175 and a 95% condence interval of

[1.08, 1.77].

Thus, while our 95% condence

interval is nested within the FGH 95% condence interval, the signicantly greater power of our design allows us to
reject the null hypothesis that the ratio equals 1the necessary threshold for establishing an increase in attention.
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The average tax rate of the bottom 50% of tax rates is 6.4%, while the average tax rate of the top 50% tax rates is
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An alternative and better-powered approach to testing endogenous response to stake size makes
use of variation in willingness to pay rather than tax rates. Since the total tax is determined by

t = τ p,

variation in either tax rates or maximal acceptable purchase prices may be used to generate

variation in stakes.
We operationalize this test by dividing all consumers (from all three arms) into three bins cor-

ik

responding to their module 2 valuation (p2
an average

θ

< 5, pik
2 ∈ [5, 10),

and

pik
2 ≥ 10),

and then estimating

for each bin. Note that we partition consumers using module 2 prices to avoid endo-

geneity issues arising from the fact that the module 1 prices will depend on a person's attention
to the tax.
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Columns (1)-(3) of Table 3 report the results of this estimation. Column 1 presents

estimates for the standard-tax arm, column 2 presents estimates for the triple-tax arm, and column
3 presents estimates for the pooled data.
average

θ

When pooling data, we allow for dierent baselines of

for the dierent arms but we assume that the impact of moving to a higher bin is the

same across the arms. Although we are underpowered for this analysis in the standard-tax arm,
the table shows that when pooling the data, or when restricting to the triple-tax arm, consumers in
the second and third bin have a higher average
average

θ

are approximately

0.12

θ

than consumers in the rst bin. The dierences in

for second vs. rst bin and 0.15 for third vs. rst bin, in both the

triple-tax arm or pooled analysis. We do not detect a dierence for average

θ

between the second

and third bin, although we also cannot reject a moderate one. This suggests that attention may
not increase linearly with price and that consumers employ dierent attention strategies for very
low price products below $5 vs. moderate price products above $5.
This analysis is consistent with attention increasing in the absolute tax

pτ .

However, this

result could also be obtained if consumers willing to pay the most for the products are also the
most attentive. Columns (4)-(6) report an analogous test, ruling out this possibility through the
inclusion of individual xed eects (Appendix D.2 formally documents how we modify our GMM
strategy).

While estimates of attention are somewhat lower than in the rst three columns, we

again nd greater inattention when

pik
2 <5

than when

pik
2 ≥ 5.

In summary, our ndings are consistent with attention allocation that is endogenous to stake
size, whether variation in stake size is generated through experimentally manipulated tax rates or
through naturally occurring variation in the prices at which consumers are marginal.
This nding becomes important when comparing average attention found in our experiment to
the attention predicted to occur at existing market prices. Subjects in our experiment valued the
considered products somewhat lower, on average, than the prices posted on Amazon.com (average
8.3%. Thus the dierence in average
as big as the dierence in average

θ

θ between the top and bottom quantiles should be only (8.3/6.4−1)/(3−1) = 0.15
θ scales linearly

between the standard- and triple-tax arms, assuming that average

with the size of the tax rate. To estimate this eect with the same level of precision that we estimate the dierence
2
between the standard- and triple-tax arms, we would thus need a sample size that is (1/0.15) ≈ 44.4 times as large.
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As an alternative approach to accounting for the endogeneity of module 1 prices and

θ,

amazon.com prices may

be used as an instrument for module 1 willingness to pay. Such an approach is ill-powered compared to our preferred
specicationpoint estimates indicate similar patterns of endogenous inattention, but we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of exogeneity. Results of this approach are reported in Appendix E.4.
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Amazon.com price:

$10.15; average module 2 willingness to pay:

$6.09).

As we document in

Appendix E.3, consumers who are marginal at market prices have average values of

θ approximately

0.1 higher than other consumers. When extrapolating the quantitative estimates of this paper into
new settings, dierences in marginal valuations between our experiment and the setting of interest
must be similarly accommodated.

4.6 Sources and Correlates of Consumer Mistakes
4.6.1 Do Consumers Know the Tax Rates?
To assess consumers' knowledge of the sales tax rates, and whether underestimation of the tax
rates generates some of the underreaction, we included the following survey question at the end of
the study: What percent is the sales tax rate in your city of residence, [city], [state]? If your city
exempts some goods from the full sales tax, please indicate the rate for a standard nonexempt good.
If you're not sure, please make your best guess.
On average, consumers' beliefs are very accurate. 52% of consumers know their tax rate exactly,
74% are within 0.5 percentage points, and 85% are within 1 percentage point. The average of beliefs
is 7.05%, while the average actual tax rate of consumers in the study is 7.32%, indicating almost
no mean bias.
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To provide a graphical summary of how perceived beliefs vary with the actual tax rate, we
construct Figure 4 which plots average perceived taxes for each of 20 quantiles of actual taxes.
The best-t regression line in the gure has an intercept of -0.28 percentage points (s.e. = 0.44),
which is not statistically dierent from 0 (p
statistically dierent from 1 (p

= 0.22).

= 0.53),

and a slope of 0.93 (s.e. = 0.06), which is not

We conclude that incorrect beliefs are a negligible source

of the consumer mistakes that we document, consistent with CLK's survey results from consumers
in a California store.

4.6.2 Demographic Covariates
In Appendix E.2, we analyze how average

θ

varies by demographic covariates, including income,

nancial literacy, ability to compute taxes, age, sex, marital status, education, and race.

When

pooling data across both arms, we nd that demographics have signicant explanatory power (F test

p < 0.01).

We nd a signicant positive association between average

and a marginally signicant positive association between average
a statistically signicant negative association between

θ

θ

θ

and nancial literacy,

θ, income, and numeracy.

We nd

and age. We nd no relationship between

and sex, marital status, education, and race.
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Although the question asked participants to enter their answer as a percent, a small minority of participants

appears to not have read the instructions and entered their answer as a decimal (e.g. 0.07 instead of 7%). For the
6% of participants who entered an answer below

0.1,

we assume that they did not enter their answer as a percent,

and thus we convert their answer by multiplying it by 100. We additionally exclude four obvious outlier values that
are above 100.
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Of these results, perhaps the most economically signicant result is that average

θ

is marginally

signicantly higher for consumers in the fourth quartile of the income distribution than for consumers
in the rst quartile of the income distribution. To the extent that the propensity of mistakes varies by
income groups, the presence of non-salient taxes will impact the regressivity of sales taxesa point
previously explored in Goldin and Homono (2013), and which we formalize in our heterogeneous
model in Appendix A.3.

4.7 Robustness to Selection on Comprehension Questions
A limitation of any experiment other than a natural eld experiment is the possibility that the
experiment confuses subjects in a manner that natural environments do not. In our context, we
were concerned that even fully optimizing subjects might misunderstand our assignment of tax
rates to experimental conditions, and thus create the appearance of underreaction to the actual tax
rates.

For this reason, our nal sample includes only study participants who correctly identied

the experimental tax rate that would apply in comprehension questions before both module 1 and
module 2.

While we prefer specications with these subjects excluded as a matter of principle,

we note that the main results of Tables 2 and 3 qualitatively replicate when re-including these
subjects. Estimates of average

θ

are systematically lower in these analyses since individuals who

do not know the experimental tax rate do not respond to it. However, as demonstrated in Tables 4
and 5, analyses including these subjects similarly demonstrate substantial inattention to taxes, with
greater attention among those facing triple taxes and in cases where valuations are comparatively
high.
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In summary, while we were concerned

our screening criteria,

ex post

ex ante

about the possibility of selection induced by

it appears that our primary results are robust to this concern.

5 Quantifying the Variation of Underreaction Across Consumers
Having established that underreaction varies across tax rates, we now turn to the measurement of
variation in

θ

across individuals.

As the results in Section 2 show, the statistic needed for welfare analysis is
variance of

p

θ

V ar[θ|p, τ ]the

for consumers who are indierent between buying the product or not at posted price

and tax rate

τ.

The statistic we aim to estimate is thus

of interest averaged over all
inequality is strict if

θ

(p1 , τ )

varies with

pairs.

τ

and

Note that

p1 .

Ep1 ,τ [V ar[θ|p1 , τ ]];

that is, our variance

Ep1 ,τ [V ar[θ|p1 , τ ]] ≤ V ar[θ],

and that this

Consequently, simply estimating the variance of

θ

would produce upward-biased estimates of how much variance is coming from individual dierences
because this statistic would also include variation in
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θ

due to dierences in

p1

and

τ.

As an alternative approach, in Appendix D.1 we derive a tight lower bound for the dierence between average

θ

in

the triple- and standard-tax arms under relatively mild assumptions about the selection process. When implementing
the lower bound, we nd that we can reject no dierence between the triple- and standard-tax conditions at the 10%
signicance level (p = 0.08). We reject this dierence at the 5% signicance level (p = 0.04) when conditioning on
ik
ik
module 2 price p2 ≥ 1, and at the 1% signicance level (p < 0.01) when conditioning on p2 ≥ 5.
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Informally, the idea behind our approach is to partition study participants into subgroups with
dierent average

θ's

based on self classications. We then compute the variance of the subgroup

means, which provides a lower bound for the total variance. We divide subjects into subgroups using
our self-classifying survey question, which we

ex ante

selected as most promising to be strongly

associated with underreaction, and which indeed turned out to be our most predictive measure

ex post.

In this section, we begin by presenting the details of our self-classifying survey question.

We then present our methodology in Section 5.2 and implement an estimate of the lower bound in
Section 5.3.

5.1 The Self-Classifying Survey Question
The self-classifying survey question asked consumers in the standard- and triple-tax arms the following: Think back to Section 1, where you made your rst twenty decisions about tag prices. In
that section, there was a sales tax that you would have to pay if you bought an item from that
section. If there was no sales tax in Section 1, would you choose higher tag prices for the products?
The possible answers to the question were Yes, which we code as
we code as

R = M;

and No, which we code as

R = L.

R = H;

Maybe a little, which

Table 6 summarizes participants' responses

to the survey question. In the standard-tax arm, 6% of participants answered Yes, 56% answered
Maybe a little, and 38% answered No. Participants in the triple-tax arm were more likely to say
Yes or Maybe than participants in the standard-tax arm (Ranksum test

p < 0.01).30

Responses to this question are strongly associated with experimental behavior. To estimate an
average

θ

for each survey response, we employ a similar methodology as in Section 4.3. Because

this survey question was not asked in the no-tax arm, we make the additional assumption A2 that
if survey responses

A2

R

are predictive of behavior, it is solely because they are correlated with

θ:

E[yik |θik , R] = E[yik |θik ]

A2 implies that for the standard- and triple-tax arms,




log(1 + θik τi )
yik − E[yik |no-tax arm]
|R = r = E
|R = r ,
E
τi
τi
h
i
ik τi )
E log(1+θ
|R
=
r
can now be estimated as in Section 4.3.
τi


Thus

(7)

Table 7 shows that this survey question has a striking degree of predictive power. The table
shows that the average
the neighborhood of

θ

0.5

is not statistically dierent from 0 for consumers who answer No, is in

for consumers who answer Maybe a little, and is in a neighborhood of 1

for consumers who answer Yes.
dierences in

30

θ

Table 7 thus shows that under assumption A2, there are stark

between dierent consumers. Moreover, the predictive power of the survey question

However, the dierence is not large in magnitude, despite being statistically signicant. One possible reason for

the minor dierence is relative thinking (Bushong et al., 2015): because taxes were much larger in the triple-tax
arm, what participants in the triple-tax arm considered a large response to the tax was likely dierent than what
participants in the standard-tax arm considered a large response to the tax.
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suggests that, consistent with models of bounded rationality and deliberate attention, people are
aware of the mistakes they make in responding to sales taxes.
However, these results do not yet prove that there are individual dierences

a price-tax pair (p1 , τ ).

Given our results about how the distribution of

θ

covaries with the tax

size, it is possible that some of these dierences may be driven by variation in

(p1 , τ ).

To quantify individual dierences

conditional on

θ

conditional on a price-tax pair (p1 , τ ),

across the pairs
we proceed with

the development of our lower-bound estimator.

5.2 A Lower-Bound for the Variance of Mistakes: Theory
R

Let

be the random variable of study participants' responses to the survey question, which can

take on the values

R = H, R = M

or

R = L.31

µ := E[φ|p, τ ], φ̄ := E[φ|R = r, p, τ ].

We now create new random variables

In words,

µ

our log-transformed data. The variable

φ

is the approximation to

is the average of

φ

p and tax rate τ .

And the variable

price

p and

amongst the marginal consumers with

τ:

consumers. For short-hand, we set

R=r

log(1+θτ )
,
τ

that we obtain from

for all consumers who are marginal at

price

tax rate

θ

φ :=

φ̄ takes on three dierent values for consumers marginal at

θ̄r := E[φ̄|R = r];

R = r,

it is the average of

this is the average

φ for

those

φ across all consumers with

(without conditioning on a price-tax pair).

Proposition 6.


Ep1 ,τ [V ar[θ|p1 , τ ]] ≥ E V ar[φ̄|p1 , τ ]

(8)

≥ P r(R = H) E[φ̄|R = H] − E(µ|R = H)

2

(9)

2
+ P r(R = M ) E[φ̄|R = M ] − E(µ|R = M )
2
+ P r(R = L) E[φ̄|R = L] − E(µ|R = L)
Proposition 6 shows that

Ep1 ,τ [V ar[θ|p1 , τ ]]

to the variance of the three-point distribution that puts mass

θ̄M ,

and the remaining mass on

θ̄L .

(11)

can be bounded from below by the signicantly

easier-to-estimate expression in (9)-(11). The expression in (9)-(11) is similar to

on

(10)

P r(R = H)

on

θ̄H ,

V ar[θR ];
mass

that is,

P r(R = M )

The dierence is that the conditional means

E[µ|R]

are

not necessarily equal to the mean of the three-point distribution, which is the unconditional mean

E[µ] = E[θ].

By using the conditional means

for the fact that

V ar[θ̄R ] would overestimate Ep1 ,τ [V ar[θ|p1 , τ ]] if all individual dierences in θ were

due simply to variation in

(p1 , τ ).

In words, the conditional mean
for each pair

(p1 , τ ),

which is

conditional distribution of
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E[µ|R] in each term in (9)-(11), the expression corrects

µ,

E[µ|R]

is constructed as follows: 1) compute the average

and then 2) compute the average

(p1 , τ )

given

R = r.

µ

with respect to the (induced)

As an example, suppose that

Our technique can be immediately generalized to any observable characteristic

of nite values.
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φ≈θ

R

R=H

was associated

that can take on any number

only with value

p1 ≥ 10, R = M

associated with values

p 1 < 5.

is captured by variation in

p1 .

was only associated with values

p1 ∈ [5, 10),

and

R=L

was only

This corresponds to a case in which all variation in survey answers
In this case, we would have that

E[µ|R = r] = θ̄r

for each

r,

and

thus the lower bound in (9)-(11) would be zero.
The idea behind the proof of Proposition 6, which is contained in the appendix, is as follows.

First, we show that

h
i
)
Ep1 ,τ [V ar[θ|p1 , τ ]] ≥ E V ar[ log(1+θτ
|τ,
p
]
,
1
τ

which follows because

the concave log transformation is a contraction and thus reduces variance.
fact that conditional on each

(p1 , τ ),

the distribution of

φ

Second, we use the

is a mean-preserving spread of the

V ar[φ|p1 , τ ] ≥ V ar[φ̄|p1 , τ ] for each (p1 , τ ), and thus that

Ep1 ,τ [V ar[θ|p1 , τ ]] ≥ E V ar[φ̄|p1 , τ ] . Third, we arrive at the nal quantity in (9)-(11) through
distribution of

φ̄.

This establishes



an application of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Although in principle one could attempt to use self-classifying survey questions to estimate the
statistic in (8), in practice it is estimable to a far lower degree of precision than the statistic in
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(9)-(11).

5.3 A Lower Bound for the Variance of Mistakes: Estimation
A challenge in estimating the lower bound from Proposition 6 is estimating the terms

r).

Because our dataset is nite, we cannot obtain an estimate of each

(p1 , τ ).

µ(p1 , τ )

E(µ|R =

for each pair

Instead, we partition the price-tax space into small cells of positive measure, and estimate

log(1+θik τi )
15
within each cell. Formally, let {pj }j=1 denote the fteen cells
τi
[0, 1], [1, 2], . . . , [14, ∞) and let {τ j }5j=1 denote the ve cells (0, 6%], [6%, 7%], . . . [9%, ∞). Because
an average value of

only 0.5% of all prices are above $15, and only 0.1% of all taxes are above 10%, we simply include
these observations in the last cells without much loss of precision. Denote by

p,

and denote by

τ (τ )

the cell containing


µ̃(p1 , τ ) = E
As the cell sizes converge to zero,

τ.

We approximate

µ(p1 , τ )

p(p) the cell containing

by


log(1 + θik τi ) ik
|p1 ∈ p(p1 ), τi ∈ τ (τ ) .
τi

µ̃ will converge to µ.

(12)

To estimate the lower bound we simply replace

each theoretical moment with it's empirical moment counterpart, and we bootstrap the standard
errors of the estimators. See Appendix D.3 for further details of the empirical implementation.
Table 8 presents the results. The top row displays our estimates of the lower bound: 0.132 for the
standard-tax arm and 0.094 for the triple-tax arm. To benchmark these estimates, consider what the
variances that would arise if consumers fully processed (θ
tax. Given a mean of
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0.25

= 1)

or completely neglected (θ

in the standard-tax arm, the variance would then be

= 0)

the

0.25 − 0.252 = 0.19

Estimating (8) would involve the average of many squares of terms, with each term measured with noise.

In

contrast, the bound in (9)-(11) rst collapses the rst moments from (8) into only three averages, and then takes the
squares of those averages. Thus the bound in (9)-(11) can be estimated much more precisely for the same reason
that the variance of an average of

n

random variables is smaller than the average of the variance of those

variables.
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n

random

in that arm.

Given a mean of approximately 0.5 in the triple-tax arm, the variance would be

0.5 − 0.52 = 0.25

in that arm. Thus our lower bound estimates are approximately 70% and 37%

of what the variances would be in the perfectly binary cases of the single- and triple-tax arms,
respectively.
To compute standard errors and the mean bias of our estimator, we use the percentile block
bootstrap (with 1000 iterations), sampling at the consumer level. As the second row shows, there
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is a small mean bias of approximately 0.01 for the standard-tax arm

the In the triple-tax arm,

all eect sizes are three times larger, and thus the relative variance of noise is nine times smaller.
We compute approximate 95% condence intervals in two ways: 1) using the standard percentile
method, and 2) using the (median-) bias-corrected percentile method.

As with mean bias, the

median bias is reassuringly small, and thus both methods produce similar approximations to the
95% condence intervals. Importantly, we nd that even the 5% condence bounds are large enough
to substantially increase the eciency costs of taxation, as we show in Section 6.1.

5.4 Alternative Approaches
In this section, we discuss the advantages of our bounding approach relative to two alternative
implementations.
As a rst alternative, notice that our experimental design allows us to calculate an estimate of

θ

for each experimental subject, since each of the 20 within-subject product evaluations provides a

noisy estimate of this parameter. Examining the distribution of these estimates provides a seemingly simple, but heavily confounded, way of inferring the distribution of

θ.

The variance of the

distribution of individually estimated coecients reects both by the true variance in

θour object

of interestas well as the approximation error inherent in making a small-sample inferencea confounding term. Implementing this strategy in our data does suggest an enormous degree of variance;
however, most of this apparent variance is driven by sampling error in individual estimates.
This approach could, in theory, be modied to deconvolve the variance of measurement error
(i.e., random uctuation in BDM valuations) and the variance of misreaction. Indeed, the no-tax
arm of our experiment was designed to identify the variance of the measurement error term, so
long as two concerns were avoided.

As practical considerations, if the variance of measurement

error encountered is either large or arm-specic, a deconvolution approach would be ill-powered or
unidentied, respectively.

As a theoretical concern, the presence of rounding heuristics in BDM

responses generates additional variance that confounds the deconvolution (though this issue does

34

not confound rst-moment estimates and thus our bounding approach).

While these alternative strategies do have the benet of providing a point estimate of the variance
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The source of the bias is that any noise in our estimates of

θ̄r

or

E[µ|R = r]

amplies our estimates of variance

because it involves squares of imperfectly estimated moments.
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In practice, about 40% of the decisions in our study are within a few cents of a round number, suggesting that

subjects do engage in some rounding behavior.
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of misreaction, we believe the practical and technical considerations favor the use of our more robust
and conservative bounding approach.

5.5 Summary of Empirical Results
To summarize our empirical results: we nd substantial evidence of heterogeneous inattention to
sales taxes. This heterogeneity is found across tax levels: under standard taxes, average attention is
given by

θ = 0.25,

whereas under triple taxes average attention increases to

this heterogeneity is found across individuals: under standard taxes,
under triple taxes

θ = 0.48.

Furthermore,

Ep1 ,τ [V ar[θ|p1 , τ ]] > 0.13

and

Ep1 ,τ [V ar[θ|p1 , τ ]] > 0.09.

6 From Empirical Magnitudes to Welfare Implications
We now use the theoretical results from Section 2 to translate the experimental results from summarized in Section 5.5 into their implied welfare consequences.

We assess our welfare estimates

relative to a benchmark that assumes that misreaction is exogenous and homogeneous, and nd
that this benchmark substantially understates the welfare costs of taxation.

6.1 Individual Dierences
To translate the estimates from Section 5.5 into excess burden estimates, we use the formula in
Proposition 2, which expresses excess burden in terms of the mean and variance of

θ.

To provide

maximally conservative estimates, we suppose that supply is perfectly elastic because, as shown in
Proposition 2, the relative importance of individual dierences increases as the elasticity of supply
decreases.
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θ,

average

For the illustrative calculations here, we approximate

and we bound

EBN C

Let

V ar[θ|p, t]

E[θ|p, t]

with our lower-bound estimate of

with our estimate of

Ep,t [V ar[θ|p, t]].

denote the excess burden that would be calculated by a neoclassical analyst who

assumes that consumers are not biased, and who relies on the elasticity of demand with respect to
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the tax.

θ

Let

EBH

be the excess burden that would be computed by an analyst who assumes that

is homogeneous, and knows the mean

θ

from, say, estimating

Dt /Dp .37

Finally, let

EB

denote

the actual excess burden.
Consider now the implications of heterogeneity for welfare inferences.
arm,

EBH ≈ (0.25)EBN C .

However, by Proposition 2, the actual excess burden is

0.132/0.25)EBN C = (0.78)EBN C .

For the triple-tax arm,

Proposition 2, the actual excess burden is
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For the standard-tax

EB ≥ (0.25 +

EBH ≈ (0.48)EBN C .

However, by

EB ≥ (0.48 + 0.094/0.48)EBN C = (0.68)EBN C .

And as discussed in Section 2.5 and further in Appendix A.2, income eects exacerbate excess burden, with that

additional eect also increasing in the variance of the bias.
εD,t
36
1 2
That is, EBneoclassical = 2 t D(p, t) p+t
37
As shown CLK (and replicated in Appendix Proposition A.1 for unit demand), the ratio
homogeneous consumers for small

t.

result, it is more generally true that

Dt /Dp

identies

θ

for

As shown in the proof of Appendix Proposition A.2 and implicitly used in the

Dt /Dp = E[θ|p, t]

for small

30

t.

Thus for the standard-tax arm, individual dierences inate excess burden by over 200% compared to a representative agent calculation, and actually bring the overall estimates closer to the neoclassical case. For the triple-tax arm, individual dierences inate excess burden by over 40% as compared to a representative agent calculation. We stress that these estimates are lower boundsboth
because we use lower bounds for the variance of

θ,

and because we assume supply is perfectly

elasticand that the actual impact of individual dierences is likely to be much greater.

6.2 Endogenous Attention
We now turn to the implications of endogenous attention that we formalize in Proposition 5. For

∆t = 2t,

the calibration, we take

and we set

E[θ|t] = 0.25

and

E[θ|t + ∆t] = 0.5,

consistent with

the experimental results. To maintain the same benchmark and units throughout the whole section,
we again compute the impact of endogenous attention against the benchmark of homogeneous and
exogenous

θ.

Under the assumption that

EB(t + ∆t) − EB(t) ≈

F (θ|p, t)

is degenerate, Proposition 5 implies that



t2
(∆t)2
(0.25)2 Dp + (0.52 − 0.252 )Dp ≈ 1.09t2 Dp
t∆t(0.5)2 +
2
2

Consider now inferences under the assumption of homogeneous and exogenous
that the analyst computes

E[θ] = 0.25

exogenous (and homogeneous)

4t2 (.25)2 D

p

=

θ,

θ.

Suppose

by studying responses to standard taxes. Then assuming

the analyst would infer the excess burden of tripling the tax to be

0.25t2 Dp . In this case, the endogeneity of

θ

with respect to

t implies that the correct
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estimate is 336% higher.

7 Discussion
In this paper, we have shown that in addition to measuring the average mistake, measuring
the variation in mistakes is crucial for questions about policy design. When there are individual
dierences in underreaction to a not-fully-salient sales tax, this increases the eciency costs arising
from that tax's distortionary eect on demand. When underreaction varies with economic incentives,
this aects the demand response to new policies and introduces a new channel by which taxes distort
behavior. Estimates from our experimental population suggest that these dimensions of variation
exist, are sizable in magnitude, and can starkly aect the welfare analysis of tax policies.
These issues are of course not unique to sales taxes, and arise in any question about tax policy.
And more broadly, these issues arise in any setting where the true price of a good is divided into
dierent components of diering salience. The theoretical framework we develop in Section 2 can be
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The analysis above could be repeated to take the variance of

variance estimates.

θ

into account by substituting our lower bound

This yields very similar results, since the variance lower bounds are very similar0.132 and

0.094and are not statistically distinguishable. Using the variance lower bounds to compute the incremental impact
on excess burden is justiable if the within-bin variances are not impacted by the size of the tax.
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easily extended to accommodate related shrouded attributes, and can therefore serve as a template
for robust behavioral welfare analysis.
While we believe our theoretical framework is broadly portable, caution is needed when using our
experimental estimates to assess welfare in external settings. When implementing our experiment,
we devoted signicant eort and resources to recruiting a broad and diverse subject population,
and to making our experiment as natural as possible despite the unusual presence of a varying tax
rate. However, as with any experiment, important external-validity concerns remain. We discuss
our two main concerns below.
First, we emphasize that our experiment relied on the use of the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak procedure to measure willingness to pay. While useful for precise, incentive-compatible elicitation of
demand curves, we worry that this mechanism could trigger a dierent psychology than simply deciding whether or not to purchase a given item. An alternative experimental design that potentially
avoids this worry (at the cost of reduced experimental power) presents take it or leave it oers, in
which consumers directly indicate whether they would purchase an item at some xed price. Previous experiments employing this design have found evidence of average inattention to sales taxes
(Feldman and Rue, 2015; Feldman et al., 2015; Taubinsky, 2017). Furthermore, Taubinsky (2017)
replicates the primary empirical estimates of this paper under this alternative experimental format.
Second, the population used in our study is likely non-representative.

Despite matching the

US population on several key observable demographics, unobserved characteristics could inuence
selection into our online survey platform. However, were heterogeneity in mistakes not present in
the general population, it would not be found in arbitrary subsamples; as such, we do not view
these issues as a hindrance to a demonstration that meaningful heterogeneity exists. We view our
measurement of these statistics as an initial step, and proof of concept, of a necessary empirical
agenda working toward robustly incorporating heterogeneity into behavioral welfare analysis.
As this agenda progresses, it will both benet from, and inform, the explicit modeling of the
psychology of bounded-rationality. In principal, rened and vetted models of attention would place
useful structure on our forecasts of heterogeneity in mistakes, and thus the corresponding implications for welfare. We aim to pursue the renement of these models and their integration into welfare
analysis in future work.
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Figure 1: Experimental Design

Notes: This gure summarizes our experimental design. For full details, see the accompanying discussion in
Section 3.
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Figure 2: Decision Format
(a) Tax Module

Notes:

(b) No Tax Module

Panel a shows an example of a pricing decision from modules where taxes apply.

Con-

sumers indicate the highest tag price at which they would buy the product. As in typical shopping
environmentsand as was explained in the experimental instructionsthe nal price that applies
at "check out" is the tag price plus sales taxes.

Panel b shows an example of a pricing decision

from modules where taxes do not apply. As can be seen in the prompt, respondents are instructed
to consider the case where no sales tax is added at the register.
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Figure 3: Average Demand Curves in the First and Second Stages of the Experiment

Notes: This gure plots demand curves from the rst and second modules of the experiment, averaging
across all 20 products..

In the rst stage, consumers face either no taxes, standard taxes, or triple their

standard taxes. In the second stage, consumers in all three arms face no additional taxes. To construct the

DkC,m (p), for each product k . C ∈{0x, 1x, 3x} denotes
the no-tax, standard-tax or triple-tax experimental arm, m denotes the module (stage), and p the before-tax
P
C,m
1
C,m
price. The average demand curves are calculated as Davg (p) :=
(p) . Panel (a) plots average
k Dk
20
gures, we start with the demand curves, denoted

demand as a function of the before-tax prices in module 1. For comparison, panel (b) plots the counterfactual
average demand in module 1 that would be expected if consumers react to taxes fully. We reconstruct the
demand curves by assuming that if a fraction
arm, then a fraction

τ.

D



p
1+τ



D(p)

of consumers are willing to buy at price

of consumers are willing to buy at a (before-tax) price

p

p

in the no-tax

when facing tax rate

Panel (c) plots demand as a function of the after-tax prices in module 1. Panel (d) plots demand as a

function of the tax-free prices in module 2.
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Figure 4: Perceived vs. Actual Sales Tax Rates

Notes:

This gure plots the relationship between the actual tax rates subjects face and the tax

rates that they believe apply. To construct the gure, we rst divide the actual tax rates into 20
quantiles. We then plot the average belief vs. the average actual tax rate for each of the quantiles.
The dashed 45-degree line represents the counterfactual of correct beliefs.
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Table 1: Demographics by Experimental Arm

All
Age
Household Income ($1,000s)
Household size

No Tax

Std. Tax

Triple tax

50.49

50.80

50.43

50.20

(14.63)

(14.28)

(14.84)

(14.82)

63.04

61.86

63.67

63.78

(56.29)

(55.00)

(58.21)

(55.77)

2.40

2.40

2.38

2.42

(1.52)

(1.60)

(1.50)

(1.46)

Married

0.34

0.33

0.36

0.34

Male

0.48

0.47

0.51

0.47

Highschool degree or higher

0.95

0.94

0.95

0.95

Education
College degree or higher

0.41

0.41

0.40

0.40

Post-graduate education

0.17

0.18

0.16

0.16

Ethnicity
Asian

0.03

0.03

0.04

0.03

Caucasian

0.77

0.76

0.77

0.78

Hispanic

0.03

0.04

0.03

0.03

African American

0.07

0.08

0.07

0.08

Other

0.02

0.03

0.02

0.02

Tax rate in city of residence

7.32

7.36

7.31

7.30

(1.15)

(1.16)

(1.13)

(1.15)

2998

1102

982

914

71%

78%

70%

65%

N

(Final Sample)

Comprehension test pass rate

p-val
p = 0.66

F-test

p = 0.68
p = 0.86
p = 0.35
p = 0.15
p = 0.74
p = 0.84
p = 0.49
p = 0.88
p = 0.57
p = 0.47
p = 0.83
p = 0.39
p = 0.36

p < 0.01

Notes: This table presents the means and standard deviations of demographic variables in each of the three
arms in our nal sample. To test whether each characteristic is equally distributed across arms, we regress
that characteristic on dummies for arms of the study, using OLS with robust standard errors, and report the
F-test

p-value

for equality of across arms. Omnibus tests also show that there are no signicant dierences

in demographics between Arm 1 vs. Arm 2 (F -test
vs. Arm 3 (F -test

p = 0.49),

p = 0.36).
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Arm 2 vs. Arm 3 (F -test

p = 0.94)

or Arm 1

Table 2: Average

Std. tax avg.

θ

(Weight Placed on Tax) by Experimental Arm

θ

(1)

(2)

(3)

All

p2 ≥ 1

p2 ≥ 5

0.261**

0.250***

(0.111)
Triple tax avg.

θ

Observations
Dierence

(0.095)

0.481***

θ

0.535***

(0.045)

(0.039)

59960

58478

32810

0.03

0.01

< 0.001

p-val

Notes: This table displays GMM estimates of average
discussed in Section 4.3.

0.475***

0.226**
(0.094)

θ

(0.041)

by experimental arm, applying the methodology

is dened as the weight that consumers place on the sales tax, with

corresponding to complete neglect of the tax and

θ = 1

corresponding to full optimization.

θ = 0

Column (1)

uses all data, Column (2) conditions on module 2 price (p2 ) being greater than 1, Column (3) conditions
on module 2 price (p2 ) being greater than 5.
parentheses. *

p < 0.1,

**

p < 0.05,

***

Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, reported in

p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Average

θ

(Weight Placed on Tax) for Dierent Product Valuations

(1)
Standard
Middle

p2

bin

0.097
(0.147)

High

p2

bin

0.115
(0.185)

Std. tax cons.

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Triple

Pooled

Standard

Triple

Pooled

0.117**

0.123**

0.097**

0.104***

(0.054)

(0.054)

0.147**
(0.074)

Individual xed eects
Observations

(0.038)

(0.038)

0.168

0.069

0.072

(0.152)

(0.053)

(0.053)

0.156

(0.140)
Triple tax cons.

(0.101)

0.154**
(0.074)

0.266*

0.077

(6)

(0.098)
0.402***

0.395***

(0.054)

(0.054)

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

40651

39378

58478

40651

39378

58478

Notes: This table displays GMM estimates of the relationship between average
considered, applying the methodology discussed in Section 4.3.

θ

θ and the valuation of the good

is dened as the weight that consumers

θ = 0 corresponding to complete neglect of the tax and θ = 1 corresponding to full
θ̄ik = α01x 11x +α03x 13x +αp2 ∈[5,10) 1p2 ∈[5,10) +αp2 ≥10 1p2 ≥10 .
We assume that αp2 ∈[5,10) and αp2 ≥10 do not change across the standard- and triple-tax arms, but we allow
1x
3x
and α0 . Columns (4)-(6) control for individual xed eects, estimating
for dierent baseline values α0
the model θ̄ik = θi + αp2 ∈[5,10) 1p2 ∈[5,10) + αp2 ≥10 1p2 ≥10 . We model the two moment conditions for each arm
place on the sales tax, with

optimization. Columns (1)-(3) estimate the model

separately, and we use the two-step GMM estimator to approximate the ecient weighting matrix for the
over-identied model. All specications condition on module 2 price (p2 ) being greater than 1. Standard
errors, clustered at the subject level, reported in parentheses. *
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p < 0.1,

**

p < 0.05,

***

p < 0.01.

Table 4:

Average

θ

(Weight Placed on Tax) by Experimental Arm, Re-including Subjects Who

Failed Comprehension Checks

Std. tax avg.

θ

Triple tax avg.
Observations
Dierence

θ

(1)

(2)

(3)

All

p2 ≥ 1

p2 ≥ 5

0.064

0.107

(0.108)

(0.086)

0.276***

0.146*
(0.085)

0.292***

0.376***

(0.040)

(0.032)

84460

82009

44918

0.03

0.02

<0.01

p-val

(0.033)

Notes: This table replicates Table 2, but does not exclude study participants who failed comprehension

checks. Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, reported in parentheses. *

p < 0.1,

**

p < 0.05,

***

p < 0.01.

Table 5: Average

θ

(Weight Placed on Tax) for Dierent Product Valuations, Re-including Subjects

Who Failed Comprehension Checks

Middle

p2

bin

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Standard

Triple

Pooled

Standard

Triple

Pooled

0.003
(0.133)

High

p2

bin

0.159
(0.169)

Std. tax cons.

0.138***
(0.047)
0.194***
(0.063)

0.117

0.037
(0.087)
0.221***
(0.046)

Observations

0.201***
(0.063)

(0.126)
Triple tax cons.
Individual xed eects

0.145***
(0.047)

0.023
(0.096)
0.330**
(0.138)

0.116***
(0.035)

0.124***
(0.034)

0.148***
(0.049)

0.150***
(0.049)

0.214***
(0.045)

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

54503

54988

82009

54503

54988

82009

Notes: This table replicates Table 3, but does not exclude study participants who failed comprehension

checks. Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, reported in parentheses. *

p < 0.01.
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p < 0.1,

**

p < 0.05,

***

Table 6: Distribution of Self-Classifying Survey Responses
Standard

Triple

0.06

0.11

Yes
Maybe a little

0.56

0.56

No

0.38

0.32

Ranksum

z = 3.80, p < 0.001

Notes: Respondents were asked whether they would buy products at higher tag prices if there was no tax
in the rst module. The multiple-choice options were Yes (R
(R

= L).

= H ),

Maybe a little (R

= M ),

or No

We report the distribution separately for the standard- and triple-tax arms, and test for a dierence

in distributions in the lower panel of the table.

Table 7: Average

θ

(Weight Placed on Tax) Conditional on Self-Classifying Survey Response

(1)
Standard
Yes average

θ

1.103***
(0.277)

A little average
No average

θ

0.436***

(2)
Triple
0.936***
(0.103)
0.622***

(0.110)

(0.048)

0.172

0.047

(0.139)

(0.056)

40651

39378

θ

Observations
Notes: This table displays GMM estimates of average

θ by consumers' responses to the self-classifying survey
θ is dened as the weight that consumers
complete neglect of the tax and θ = 1 corresponding

questions, applying the methodology discussed in Section 4.3.
place on the sales tax, with

θ =0

corresponding to

to full optimization. Column (1) provides estimates for the standard-tax arm and Column (2) provides
estimates for the triple-tax arm. All specications condition on module 2 price (p2 ) being greater than 1.
Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, reported in parentheses. *
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p < 0.1,

**

p < 0.05,

***

p < 0.01.

Table 8: Lower Bound Estimates for the Expected Conditional Variance of

θ

(Weight Placed on

Tax)

Standard

Triple

Lower bound estimate

0.132

0.094

Bias (mean)

0.009

0.001

Standard error

0.051

0.019

95% conf. int.

(0.054, 0.251)

(0.063, 0.135)

Bias-corrected conf. int.

(0.049, 0.237)

(0.064, 0.136)

Ep1 ,τ [V ar[θ|p1 τ ]], estimated for both the standard- and tripleθ is dened as the weight that consumers place on the sales
neglect of the tax and θ = 1 corresponding to full optimization.

Notes: This table presents lower bounds for

tax arms using the methodology of Section 5.
tax, with

θ=0

corresponding to complete

We compute standard errors and mean bias (Efron 1982) using the percentile (non-accelerated) bootstrap
(with 1000 iterations), blocking by consumers. We compute approximate 95% condence intervals using the
unadjusted bootstrap, as well as the median bias correcting bootstrap (Efron 1987).
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